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Consumer Credit and the Learned Professions of 
Law and Medicine 
James H. Backman* 
Traditionally, doctors, dentists,' lawyers, and other profes- 
sionals dealing with consumers have observed a restriction on 
imposing interest charges on accounts receivable from patients 
and  client^.^ Most professionals have handled accounts on a short 
term credit basis without imposing any finance charges what- 
~oever .~ Statements for services rendered have typically been sent 
to account debtors with the expectation that payment would be 
received before the next monthly statements were mailed. Delin- 
quent patients and clients have received successive statements 
until their accounts were either satisfied or written off as bad 
debts. Generally, no interest charges, late fees, or penalties have 
been assessed even though an account remained unpaid. Nor 
have discounts been offered to those who pay for their services in 
advance or on time. 
Under Truth in Lending provisions of the Federal Consumer 
Credit Protection Act,' Congress has exempted the traditional 
professional service account from the Act's extensive require- 
ments. Unless the credit arrangement involves a finance charge 
or by agreement may be paid in more than four installments, the 
creditor is not subject to the Truth in Lending Act? Therefore, 
-- 
* Associate Professor of Law, Brigham Young University; A.B., 1969, Harvard Col- 
lege; J.D., 1972, University of Utah. The author acknowledges the research assistance of 
Douglas Lowe, Brigham Young University law student. 
1. As used in Part I of this article, the terms "medicine" and "doctors" include 
"dentistry" and "dentists." 
2. See, e.g., 1 ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, INFORMAL 
OPINIONS, NO. C-741 (1964); AMA OPINIONS AND REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL 8 7, NO. 
14, at 40 (1971). 
3. AMA OPINIONS AND REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL Q 7, NO. 14(3), a t  41; UNIFORM 
CONSUMER C EDIT CODE Q 1.301(12), Comment to $4 (12) (hereinafter cited as UCCC). 
4. The Federal Truth in Lending Act is Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968), 15 U.S.C. 45 1601-1613, 1631-1644, 1661-1665, 
1671-1677 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Regulation Z, promulgated by the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, implements the statute and is found a t  12 C.F.R. Q 226 
(1976) [hereinafter referred to as Reg. Z]. The statute and regulations require disclosure 
of the terms of a consumer credit transaction. The statutory authorization for Reg. Z is 
found at Truth in Lending Act § 105, 15 U.S.C. Q 1604 (1970). 
5. Truth in Lending Act Q 103(f), 15 U.S.C. Q 1602(f) (Supp. V 1975); Reg. Z, 12 
C.F.R. Q 226.2(s) (1976). 
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the normal short term credit arrangements for payment of profes- 
sional services are not included in the Act's definition of con- 
sumer credit sales. Nevertheless, as this article will explain, pro- 
fessionals do not have a blanket exemption from the Act's re- 
quirements. 
There is a growing trend among professionals to borrow 
credit practices from retail businesses in an effort to encourage 
prompt payment for services."t appears that a t  least some of 
these new credit practices may bring the professional within the 
framework of the new laws on consumer credit.' For example, the 
-- 
6. In October 1976, the author sent 320 questionnaires regarding billing practices to 
doctors, dentists, and lawyers in Provo and Salt Lake City, Utah, and to recent graduates 
and members of the Board of Visitors of the Brigham Young University J. Reuben Clark 
Law School practicing in California, Arizona, New Mexico, Idaho, Oregon, Washington, 
Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Kansas, and Washington, D.C. As of November 13, 1976, 116 
responses had been received [hereinafter referred to as Billing Practice Survey]. 
The questionnaire consisted of five short questions. The questions and a summary of 
the affirmative responses for each profession are given below: 
1. Do you enter into payment agreements with consumer clients or patients 
permitting payment in more than four installments? 
11 of 15 dentists 
10 of 17 doctors 
59 of 83 attorneys 
2. Do you offer a discount to cash-paying clients or patients or for prompt 
payments? 
6 of 15 dentists 
4 of 17 doctors 
12 of 83 attorneys 
(It appears that many of these discounts are in the form of an adjustment or 
settlement to accommodate clients or patients who are hard pressed or badly 
delinquent. These are not the type of discount giving rise to Truth in Lending 
obligations.) 
3. Do you assess penalty (late payment) charges on delinquent accounts? 
6 of 15 dentists 
8 of 17 doctors 
10 of 83 attorneys 
4. Do you assess finance charges for the extension of credit? 
4 of 15 dentists 
1 of 17 doctors 
2 of 83 attorneys 
5. Do you permit payment by bank credit cards? 
9 of 15 dentists 
2 of 17 doctors 
10 of 83 attorneys 
The number of professionals who did not use any of the five credit practices 
were; 
2 of 15 dentists 
4 of 17 doctors 
17 of 83 attorneys 
7. One group of professionals has explained that professionals 
7831 CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE PROFESSIONS 785 
American Bar Association (ABA) recently reversed earlier pro- 
nouncements in allowing the use of bank credit cards in payment 
for professional  service^.^ As a result, many attorneys and physi- 
cians have adopted this method of financing consumer payment. 
In addition, installment payment arrangements for professional 
services may subject lawyers and doctors to Truth in Lending 
laws because of the Federal Reserve Board's "More than Four 
Installment Rule," which has recently become a part of the 
amended act.' Even though there is no finance charge assessed, 
an installment contract providing for payment in more than four 
installments is by definition subject to Truth in Lending require- 
ments. Another practice that may bring professionals within 
reach of the federal consumer credit law is the seemingly benevo- 
lent practice of offering cash payment discounts.1° Cash-paying 
patients and clients are benefited, but the consumers who fail to 
take advantage of the cash payment discount are often subjected 
to shocking effective rates of interest. Finally, a number of profes- 
sionals include language on their statements to the effect that a 
service charge of 1-112 percent per month will be added to ac- 
counts that are not paid within thirty days. 
In general, a legitimate delinquency charge does not trigger 
the Truth in Lending disclosure requirements." But if the late 
incur a risk of liability every time they use a credit application form, make a 
decision whether to extend credit, determine the rate of interest they wish to 
charge for credit, disclose the credit terms to the customer a t  the time credit is 
extended, determine the terms of the credit agreement, or bill the patient for 
services rendered. 
OREGON DENTAL ASS'N, EXPLANATION F CREDIT LAWS 1 (1976). This booklet provides a 
helpful overview for the professional who extends credit directly to the patient or client. 
8. ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, RECENT OPINIONS, NO. 338 
(1974). See also AMA Opinions and Reports of the Judicial Council 9 7, No. 13 & 14, at 
40-41. As a practical matter, a professional need not make Truth in Lending disclosures 
when allowing use of bank credit cards since the sponsoring bank will assume that respon- 
sibility. Nevertheless, the professional who accepts bank credit card payments is subject 
to the Truth in Lending Act. 
9. Truth in Lending Act 9 103(f), 15 U.S.C. 9 1602(f) (Supp. V 1975). Previously, the 
More than Four Installment Rule had been introduced. 12 C.F.R. 9 226.2(k) (1970) 
(current version at  12 C.F.R. 9 226.2(s) (1976)). The rule had been heavily criticized as 
an unauthorized extension of Truth in Lending by the Federal Reserve Board (FRB). The 
rule was upheld, however, by the Supreme Court, in Mourning v. Family Publications 
Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973). See Warren & Larmore, Truth in Lending: Problems of 
Coverage, 24 STAN. L. REV. 793, 819 n.114 (1972). Subsequently Congress expressly ac- 
cepted the extension by amending the original definition of "creditor." Act of Oct. 28, 
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 9 303, 88 Stat. 1511 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 9 1602(f) (Supp. V 
1975)). 
lo. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(0) (1976). 
11. Id. 9 226,4(c): "A late payment, delinquency . . . or other such charge is not a 
finance charge if imposed for actual unanticipated late payment . . . ." 
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charge is anticipated from the inception of the credit account, it 
is viewed as an interest charge or finance charge.12 Obviously, it 
is a fuzzy line between the actual delinquency charge and the 
hidden finance charge which necessitates Truth in Lending dis- 
closures. Each of these potential problem areas will be examined 
in the first part of this article in order to acquaint professionals 
with the practices they are employing that could convert them 
into creditors who must comply with technical requirements of 
Truth in Lending and other related statutes. 
The second part of the article will discuss the relationship of 
consumer credit practices to the ethical standards of the learned 
professions. As members of these professions, practitioners of law 
and medicine are subject to ethical standards set by professional 
associations. Irrespective of the application of the consumer 
credit laws to practices in these professions, certain credit prac- 
tices may constitute breaches of professional ethical standards. 
For example, prior to the enactment of Truth in Lending legisla- 
tion, the Committee on Professional Ethics of the American Bar 
Ass~ciation'~ made rulings14 under the Association's Canons of 
Professional Ethics15 condemning two of the practices being con- 
sidered in this article-discounts for prompt paymentl%nd late 
payment charges on delinquent accounts.17 Subsequently, the 
American Bar Association adopted a new Code of Professional 
Responsibility, l8 replacing the former Canons of Professional Eth- 
12. 12 C.F.R. § 226.401 (1976) (FRB Interpretation of Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c) 
(1976)). 
13. The Standing Committee on Professional Ethics was created in 1913 by an 
amendment to the ABA constitution and bylaws. In 1919 the Committee's name was 
changed to the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances. In 1958 the Committee 
was separated into two committees: a Committee on Professional Ethics and a Committee 
on Professional Grievances. 
14. The Committee designates as Formal Opinions interpretations it believes to be 
of broad, general interest. Informal Decisions and Opinions are responses to questions that 
are comparatively narrow in scope and arise infrequently. The term "Informal Decision" 
is used through Informal Decision 838 in 1 ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY, INFORMAL OPINIONS (1975). Thereafter the term "Informal Opinion" is 
used. 
15. The original Canons of Professional Ethics, to and including Canon 32, were 
adopted by the ABA House of Delegates a t  the Thirty-first Annual Meeting, August 27, 
1908. The Canons were replaced by the Code of Professional Responsibility in August 1969. 
The new Code does not abandon the basic premises of the old Canons. Rather, it expands 
and clarifies the ethical considerations upon which the Canons were based. 
16. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, NO. 151 (1936). 
17. ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, INFORMAL OPINIONS, NO. 
C-741 (1964). 
18. The thought of studying the Canons with a view of possible revision was not a 
new one. In 1928, 1933, and 1937 special committees made reports recommending overall 
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ics. A recent Formal Opinion by the Committee on Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility has taken a more relaxed approach to 
credit practices by permitting attorneys to accept the use of 
credit cards for the payment of legal services and to charge inter- 
est on delinquent accounts under certain conditions.lg These new 
rulings appear to contradict former positions taken by the Ameri- 
can Bar Association without adequately explaining the justifica- 
tions for the changes. The second part of this article will, there- 
fore, attempt to reconcile the standards set forth in the Code of 
Professional Responsibility with the evolving positions reflected 
in opinions of ABA ethics committees. It will also explore the 
ethical standards of the medical profession as they relate to credit 
practices. 
The Truth in Lending Act, in effect since July 1, 1969, ap- 
plies to all aspects of commerce involving consumer credit, in- 
cluding the loan, sales, and services indus t r ie~ .~~ The professions 
of law and medicine regularly serve the needs of con~umers ,~~  
whose interests are protected by the Act. Many consumer clients 
and patients who are unable to pay cash for professional services 
are permitted to make payments on short term credit or by in- 
stallments." Thus, lawyers and doctors are frequently involved as 
creditors in the consumer credit market and are within the scope 
of the Most credit extended by lawyers and doctors, how- 
ever, fits within an exemption of the Truth in Lending Act. 
The Act's main exemption affecting professional transac- 
tions, other than the business or governmental credit exemp- 
revisions. In 1954 a committee of the American Bar Foundation made extensive studies 
of the Canons and recommended further work. None of these efforts, however, produced 
concrete results. In 1964, at the request of President Lewis F. Powell, Jr., a special com- 
mittee was created. The result of the committee's work is embodied in the new Code. 
19. ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, RECENT OPINIONS, No. 
338 (1974). 
20. Truth in Lending Act § 103(f), 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (1970). 
21. A consumer credit transaction is "one in which the party to whom credit is offered 
or extended is a natural person, and the money, property, or services which are the subject 
of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, household, or agricultural purposes." 
Truth in Lending Act § 103(h), 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h) (1970). 
22. The availability of insurance coverage affects the billing practices of many doc- 
tors and dentists, although seldom those of attorneys. Thus, doctors and dentists are often 
relieved of the need to extend credit by billing the patient's insurance company directly. 
23. Some state laws exempt physicians and dentists from consumer credit regula- 
tions. See, e.g., Unruh Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1802.2 (West 1970). 
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t i ~ n , ~ ~  is the short term credit exclusion. Short term, interest free 
credit transactions are exempt from the requirements of Truth in 
Lending since they are not covered by the Act's definition of 
consumer credit-"credit which is payable by agreement in more 
than four installments or for which the payment of a finance 
charge is or may be required."25 Thus, under the traditional finan- 
cial arrangement between a lawyer and his consumer client, or a 
doctor and his consumer patient, the professional is sheltered 
from the burdensome requirements of the Truth in Lending Act. 
Recently, however, professionals, motivated by changing 
commercial pressures and an increased awareness of credit costs, 
have adopted certain credit practices, three of which in particular 
might destroy their exempt status and subject them to the pen- 
alty provisions of the Truth in Lending Act if the disclosure re- 
quirements of the Act are not fully followed. A lawyer or doctor 
may be subject to the Act because he agrees to accept payments 
in more than four installments, because he charges a late fee for 
delinquent accounts in such a manner that the charge must be 
considered a finance charge, or because he offers his clients or 
patients a prompt payment discount. Each of these practices, as 
will be discussed more fully, brings the lawyer or doctor within 
the full panoply of requirements and sanctions of the Truth in 
Lending Act. 
If a doctor or lawyer is subject to the Act, he must conform 
to the Act's complex and technical disclosure requirements. The 
necessary disclosures are set forth in two different catego- 
ries-those for open end credit plans26 and those for credit other 
than open endan Credit extended by professionals for the pay- 
24. Truth in Lending Act § 104(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1603(1) (1970). 
25. Truth in Lending Act 5 103(f), 15 U.S.C. 5 1602(f) (Supp. V 1975). 
26. Truth in Lending Act 5 127, 15 U.S.C. § 1637 (1970); Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. P 226.7 
(1976). 
Open-end credit is credit extended for a number of different transactions 
under a single agreement. For example, a department store ordinarily will open 
a credit account and allow a customer to make various charges against the 
customer's credit limit. The customer does not fill out a new application with 
each purchase, but rather makes the purchase pursuant to the terms of the 
original credit agreement. A [professional] ordinarily would be extending open- 
end credit if a patient, or a patient's family, is entitled to make regular charges 
under a credit plan. 
OREGON DENTAL ASS'N, supra note 7, a t  6 (1976). 
If the professional offers open end credit, the disclosure requirements become highly 
complicated. In such cases, the need for qualified counsel is crucial. 
27. Truth in Lending Act § 128, 15 U.S.C. § 1638 (1970); Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. 5 226.8 
(1976). 
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ment of service fees will generally be characterized as other than 
open end credit, since the hallmark of open end credit-repeated 
transactions covered by the same credit planz8-is usually not 
present. Thus, most professional credit transactions that are sub- 
ject to the Act must include disclosures, before the credit is ex- 
tended,2D of (1) the "cash price" of the service,30 (2) the amount 
of any "cash down payment,"31 (3) the resulting "unpaid balance 
of cash price,"32 (4) the total "amount financed,"33 (5) the amount 
of the "finance charge,"34 (6) the "annual percentage rate" of the 
finance charge,35 (7) the total price to be paid under the credit 
plan ("deferred payment price"),36 (8) the schedule of payments, 
including the number, amount, and due dates of payments sched- 
uled to repay the indebtedne~s,~' (9) the sum of such scheduled 
payments ("total of  payment^"),^^ and (10) the amount, or 
- - 
One type of credit which requires disclosure is "closed-end" credit. Closed- 
end credit is credit extended for payment of an obligation incurred in connection 
with a single transaction. For example, if a patient requires extensive 
[professional] services and the [professional] extends credit for that purpose, 
the credit most likely would be closed-end credit. Repeated charges under a 
continuing credit plan would not be closed-end credit. 
If a [professional] allows a patient to enter into a second credit agreement, 
the credit continues to be closed end, even though the first credit is not totally 
paid and the amounts of credit are consolidated into the second agreement, so 
long as the initial agreement only covers the initial extension of credit. If the 
initial agreement allowed the patient to make further charges in the future, it 
would not be closed-end credit. 
OREGON DENTAL ASS'N, supra note 7, at 5 (1976). 
28. Truth in Lending Act § 103(i), 15 U.S.C. § 1602(i) (1970); Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. 6 
226.2(x) (1976). FRB Interpretatation of 4 226.2(x) explains: "Under an open end credit 
account plan, it is contemplated that there will be or may be repetitive transactions on a 
revolving basis." 12 C.F.R. § 226.203(a). 
29. Truth in Lending Act § 128(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1638(b) (1970); Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. 6 
226.8(a) (1976). 
30. Truth in Lending Act § 128(a)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(1) (1970); Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. 
§ 226.8(c)(1) (1976). The quotation marks in this list indicate the terms that must be used 
for disclosures. 
31. Truth in Lending Act § 128(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(2) (1970); Reg. Z,12 C.F.R. 
§ 226.8(c)(2) (1976). 
32. Truth in Lending Act § 128(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(3) (1970); Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. 
0 226.8(c)(3) (1976). 
33. Truth in Lending Act § 128(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(5) (1970); Reg. Z,12 C.F.R. 
4 226.8(~)(7) (1976). 
34. Truth in Lending Act § 128(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. 8 1638(a)(6) (1970); Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. 
0 226.8(c)(8)(i) (1976). 
35. Truth in Lending Act § 128(a)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(7) (1970); Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. 
4 226.8(b)(2) (1976). 
36. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. 6 226.8(c)(8)(ii) (1976). 
37. Truth in Lending Act § 128(a)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(8) (1970); Reg. Z,12 C.F.R. 
§ 226.8(b)(3) (1976). 
38. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. 8 226.8(b)(3) (1976). 
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method of computing the amount, of any late payment chargesa3@ 
Other disclosure requirementsd0 are not normally applicable in 
the extension of consumer credit by doctors and lawyers. 
A. The More Than Four Installment Ruled1 
Originally, the Truth in Lending Act's definition of consumer 
credit did not expressly include "credit which is payable by agree- 
ment in more than four  installment^."^^ The rule, first adopted 
by the Federal Reserve Board in Regulation Z," was challenged 
on the ground that it expanded the statutory definition of con- 
sumer credit transactions contained in the Truth in Lending 
Act." Attempts to eliminate the rule by judicial action were un- 
successful, however, and the rule was held valid by the United 
States Supreme Court in Mourning u. Family Publications Ser- 
39. Truth in Lending Act 4 128(a)(9), 15 U.S.C. 4 1638(a)(9) (1970); Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. 
9 226.8(b) (4) (1976). 
40. The disclosures usually not applicable in credit arrangements by doctors and 
lawyers include: 
(1) description of any security interest involved (Truth in Lending Act § 128(a)(10), 
15 U.S.C. 8 1638(a)(10) (1970); Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 228.8(b)(5) (1976)); 
(2) prepayment penalty charges (Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. 8 226.8(b)(6) (1976)); 
(3) other charges included in the amount of credit extended but which are not part 
of the finance charge (Truth in Lending Act § 128(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(4) (1970); 
Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. 226.8(c)(4) (1976)); 
(4) notice of customer's right of rescission (Truth in Lending Act 4 125, 15 U.S.C. 4 
1635 (1970); Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.9 (1976)); 
(5) balloon payments (Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(3)(1976)); 
(6) prepaid finance charges (Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(7) & .8(e) (1976)); and 
(7) trade-in downpayments (Truth in Lending Act § 128(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. 4 
1638(a)(2) (1970); Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(~)(2) (1976). 
41. Two commentators have analyzed the relation of Truth in Lending, including the 
More than Four Installment Rule, to the legal and medical professions. Note, The Attor- 
ney as an Extender and Arranger of Credit, 4 U.C.D.L. REV. 261 (1971); Warren & Lar- 
more, supra note 9. 
42. Truth in Lending Act § 103(f), 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (1970). It  should be noted that 
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) in its most recent form incorporates the 
disclosure requirements of the Truth in Lending Act. UCCC § 3.201 (1974 version). There 
were definitional differences between early versions of the UCCC and the Truth in Lend- 
ing Act. For instance, disclosure requirements under the UCCC applied to agreements 
involving payment in four or more installments, UCCC 8 1.301(12) (1969 version), whereas 
the 1974 version matches the Truth in Lending requirement for disclosures if more than 
four periodic payments are involved. UCCC § 1.301(30) (1974 version). 
43. See note 9 supm. 
44. Originally, Truth in Lending Act 4 103(f), 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (1970) read: "The 
term 'creditor' refers only to creditors who regularly extend, or arrange for the extension 
of, credit for which the payment of a finance charge is required, whether in connection 
with loans, sales of property or services, or otherwise." Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 
90-321, 82 Stat. 146. 
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vice, I ~ C . ~ ~  The rule has since been incorporated into the Act by 
amendment .46 
The purpose of the rule is to remove a loophole from the 
original Act. The Act purports to cover all transactions where 
credit customers are charged more for goods and services than 
cash customers. There was a fear that creditors would circumvent 
the Act by hiding finance charges in an inflated retail price." To 
prevent this possibility, the Federal Reserve Board, and later 
Congress, adopted the More than Four Installment Rule, thus 
requiring all creditors to comply with Truth in Lending require- 
ments, whether or not they assess a finance charge, whenever the 
consumer and creditor agree to a payment arrangement involving 
more than four installments. 
Doctors and lawyers objected strenuously to the rule48 be- 
cause they had traditionally permitted clients and patients to pay 
for services in installments without assessing any finance charge 
for the pr i~i lege.~~ The Supreme Court declared the More than 
Four Installment Rule valid, notwithstanding "the fact that the 
regulation may affect such  individual^."^^ It does not matter that 
the rule subjects to regulation some professionals who do not 
"participate in the conduct the legislation was intended to deter 
or control."51 Thus, lawyers, and doctors are subject to the More 
than Four Installment Rule, even though no finance charge is 
involved and even if they can show that the deferred payments 
do not exceed the charges for cash-paying clients or patients. 
An important exception to the rule arises from the require- 
ment that payment in more than four installments be pursuant 
to agreement. The Federal Reserve Board has stated that if a 
patient or client unilaterally decides to pay in more than four 
installments, the professional may accept such payments without 
becoming subject to Truth in Lending requirernenhs2 To fall 
45. 411 U.S. 356 (1973). 
46. Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 303, 88 Stat. 1511 (codified at Truth 
in Lending Act $ 103(f), 15 U.S.C. 1602(f) (Supp. V 1975)). 
47. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 366 (1973). 
48. Warren & Larmore, supra note 9, a t  819. 
49. Several respondents to the Billing Practice Survey, supra note 6, commented on 
their approach: 
"When patients indicate inability to pay in full we accept monthly pay- 
ments (often as little as $5 per month)." 
"Most major bills are covered by insurance-remaining balance is usually 
cleared in monthly payments." 
50. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 373 (1973). 
51. Id. a t  374. 
52. The staff of the Federal Reserve Board has explained in an opinion letter: 
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within the exception, however, professionals must be careful to 
bill for the full fee with each statement. They must also avoid 
indicating to the patient or client in any way that he may pay in 
more than four installments. This exception is important to pro- 
fessionals who wish to avoid Truth in Lending requirements yet 
desire to allow patients or clients to defer payments.53 
A further exemption from the More than Four Installment 
Rule applies to a common practice among obstetricians and or- 
thodon t i s t~ .~~  These doctors, who enter into a fee arrangement 
with patients for services to be provided over a period of time, can 
accept payments in installments without the necessity of comply- 
ing with the Truth in Lending Act. Each partial payment is con- 
sidered payment for services that have been completed up to that 
time. If the amount due for services completed never exceeds the 
amount that will be paid in four installments, then the More than 
Four Installment Rule will not apply. But if a patient falls behind 
The Board recognizes the fact that physicians, although generally sending 
monthly statements requesting full payment, do permit patients to pay bills in 
installments. There is nothing in either the Act or the Regulation that would 
prohibit this practice. Please note the words "pursuant to an agreement" . . . . 
As long as a physician has not agreed to more than four instalments-and, of 
course, does not charge a finance charge-he is not subject to the Regulation. 
Should a patient pay installments, as opposed to the full amount for which 
he is billed, this would be his unilateral action and the physician in accepting 
such payments again would not subject himself to the provisions of the Regula- 
tion. 
FRB Letter No. 32, July 8, 1969, [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 
fi 30,434. See Warren & Larmore, supra note 9, a t  820. See also Unnumbered FRB Letter, 
Dec. 2, 1969, [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) fi 30,228; Unnum- 
bered FRB Letter, Oct. 15, 1969, id. fi 30,558; Unnumbered FRB Letter, Aug. 9, 1969, id. 
r[ 30,180; FRB Letter No. 53, Aug. 5, 1969, id. 7 31,243. (FRB Letters from April 1969 to 
April 1974 are presently found in a transfer binder entitled Truth-in-Lending, Special 
Releases-Correspondence. More recent letters are found under the same title in 5 
CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE (CCH).) 
53. It appears that many professionals are eligible for the "not pursuant to agree- 
ment" exception. Some of the responses to the Billing Practice Survey, supra note 6, were: 
"[There are] no 'agreements', but we accept payment a t  whatever rate the 
patient wishes-no interest or penalties." 
"At times we are ultimately paid in installments, but not pursuant to prior 
arrangement." 
"There is usually a discussion with the client and an agreement concerning 
the approximate amount of the fee, but we do not normally discuss installment 
payments, except to say the client should pay as billed as the matter is progress- 
ing." 
"Many times it takes more than four installments, but we encourage them 
to pay in three or less payments." 
54. FRB Letter No. 262, Feb. 19, 1970, [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CONS. CRED. 
GUIDE (CCH) fi 30,516; FRB Letter No. 214, Dec. 16, 1969, id. 1 30,510. See Warren & 
Larmore, supra note 9, a t  820. 
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in payment so that more than four installment payments are 
owed for services already performed, then the doctor is subject to 
the Truth in Lending requirements? 
Despite these escape valves that are built into the More than 
Four Installment Rule, professionals face the danger that courts 
will require them to comply with the Truth in Lending Act when- 
ever they accept payment in more than four installments. The 
court may find an implied agreement by the doctor or lawyer to 
accept multiple installments because of a course of conduct of 
accepting partial payments in more than four installments in a 
large proportion of accounts.56 In light of this danger, it may be 
best for the professional to make the disclosures necessary to 
comply with Truth in Lending requirements. The Federal Trade 
Commission has suggested the following form for use by doctors 
and lawyers who regularly permit patients or clients to pay in 
more than four installments .57 
- -- 
55. One orthodontist explained a practice that would protect professionals from this 
pitfall: 
When an account becomes delinquent, it is customary among orthodontists 
to place a patient on an inactive "rest" basis to afford the [patient or his] 
parents an opportunity to catch up on back payments. 
During the rest period no further monthly payments are charged . . . and 
appointments are given with sufficient frequency to guard against regression of 
work already accomplished. 
However, no adjustments for further progress are made. 
Billing Practice Survey, supra note 6. 
56. Warren & Larmore, supra note 9, a t  820. 
Several professionals responding to the Billing Practice Survey, supra note 6, appear 
to engage in such a course of conduct: 
"I serve primarily individuals who are unable to make large payments." 
"The majority of our accounts are paid in installments." 
"We allow clients who cannot pay a retainer a reasonable period to pay. Some 
have paid as little as $5 per month for a year." 
One dentist indicated that he regularly accepted payments in more than four install- 
ments, explaining, "large families find it easier to pay at  least $10 or more monthly." 
57. FTC, Division of Consumer Credit, Staff Letter, July 1, 1969, [1969-1974 Trans- 
fer Binder] CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 7 30,253. "FINANCE CHARGE" and "ANNUAL 
PERCENTAGE RATE" may be omitted if there are no charges for credit. Id. 
The Federal Trade Commission, Division of Consumer Credit, has summarized the 
More than Four Installment Rule for medical and dental services: 
The Truth in Lending Act requires disclosure if the transaction involves a 
consumer and the commodity or services are for personal, family or household 
use. Further, the obligation must involve a finance charge or be repayable, by 
agreement, in more than four installments. 
At the outset, it should be made clear that the Truth in Lending Act does 
not come into play in a situation in which the patient decides on his own to pay 
his bill in installments, or whenever he can. However, when a physician (hospi- 
tal, etc.) comes to a specific agreement with a patient to pay the physician's fee 
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Dr. John Doe 
10 Main Street 
Washington, D.C. 
Patient's Name Patient's Address 
1. Cash Price (Medical Fee) 
Less: Cash Down Payment 
(Advance Payment) 
2. Unpaid Balance of Cash Price 
3. Amount Financed 
4. FINANCE CHARGE 
5. Total of Payments (3+4) 
6. Deferred Payment Price (1+4) 








The "Total of Payments" shown above is payable to Dr. John Doe 
at  the address shown above in 10 monthly installments of $40.00, 
the first installment being payable , 
19-, and all subsequent installments are due on the same day 
on each consecutive month until paid in full. 
Date Patient's Signature 
B. Imposing Charges on Delinquent Accounts 
It has become common for professional billing statements to 
contain a notice that "Interest at the rate of - percent per 
month, which is an annual percentage rate of - percent, will 
be charged on all accounts not paid within 30 days."58 The doctor 
in more than four installments then-at that point in time-Ftegulation Z re- 
quires written disclosure of all (and only) applicable points of information at the 
time of the agreement regardless of the existence of finance charges. This will 
be a simple matter in actual implementation, and the attached form illustrates 
a proper disclosure for medical-dental-hospital transactions. 
Should a physician, dentist, orthodontist, hospital, etc. enter into an agree- 
ment for payments in more than four installments-as opposed to sending 
monthly bills for the services as they are rendered-then the attached brief 
disclosure would satisfy the Truth in Lending Act and no other disclosure is 
required. 
Id. 
58. Among the sample billing forms received as part of the Billing Practice Survey, 
supra note 6, were the following notations: 
"1 % percent per month if payment schedule is not met." 
"A service charge of 1/2 percent per month charged on all acounts over 30 days 
old." 
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or lawyer who imposes such a charge must be careful to avoid 
losing the exemption from Truth in Lending requirements he 
might otherwise enjoy. 
Finance charge disclosure is a major requirement of the 
Truth in Lending Act. A "finance charge" includes "all charges, 
payable . . . as an incident to the extension of credit."5g Although 
late payment or delinquency charges would clearly fit in this 
general definition of the "finance charge" under Regulation 2, 
they need not be mentioned as a "finance charge" if they are 
"imposed for actual unanticipated late payment."60 
In some circumstances, however, a charge imposed on an 
overdue account may be considered interest rather than an unan- 
ticipated late payment charge and therefore must be disclosed in 
advance as part of the finance charge.61 For instance, if a lawyer 
or doctor "imposes late payment charges periodically without 
regarding the account as delinquent or in default and without 
taking steps to collect the outstanding balance, [the Federal Re- 
serve Board] would view the late payment charges as finance 
charges."" The crucial question, then, is whether a charge is lev- 
ied solely because of an "actual unanticipated late payment." 
The Federal Reserve Board has issued Interpretation 226.401, 
entitled "Service charges on accounts not paid within a given 
period of time,"63 to deal with that question: 
Some vendors bill their customers for property or services 
purchased under the terms of a credit plan which requires that 
- -- - - - - - - -  - - -  
"A finance charge will be assessed on all amounts past due for 30 days or 
more, amounts which [sic] finance charge is computed by a periodic rate of one 
and one-half percent (1 112%) per month which is an annual percentage rate of 
eighteen percent (18%) per annum." 
The confusion engendered by the Truth in Lending Act, even among attorneys, is 
illustrated by the last excerpt wherein the attorney a t  least attempts to use the Truth in 
Lending language. The Truth in Lending Act does not require any special language for 
the "true" late charge. Furthermore, the attorney has not given sufficient disclosure to 
protect himself in the event the charges on delinquent accounts are found to trigger Truth 
in Lending disclosure requirements. 
59. Truth in Lending Act § 106(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1970). 
60. Reg. 2, 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c) (1976); FRB Letter No. 416, Oct. 29, 1970,[1969-1974 
Transfer Binder] CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 7 30,605. 
61. FRB Letter No. 424, Nov. 18, 1970, [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CONS. CRED. 
GUIDE (CCH) 7 30,611. 
62. FRB Letter No. 838, Sept. 4, 1974, 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 7 31,160. Even if 
the doctor or lawyer seldom imposes the charge, he has a legal right to do so and "his 
intent in selecting which overdue accounts to charge the fee is not determinative of 
whether the fee is a finance charge" or a late payment charge. FRB Letter No. 883, Mar. 
26, 1975, id. 7 31,208. 
63. 12 C.F.R. § 226.401 (1976) (interpreting Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. 5 226.4 (1976)). 
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the full amount of each billing be paid within a stipulated pe- 
riod after billing, with no privilege of paying in installments. If 
the bill is not paid within that stipulated period of time, the 
vendor imposes a service charge periodically on the unpaid bal- 
ance until the account is paid in full. The question arises as to 
whether Regulation Z applies to such transactions. 
When in the ordinary course of business a vendor's billings 
are not paid in full within that stipulated period of time, and 
under such circumstances the vendor does not, in fact, regard 
such accounts in default, but continues or will continue to 
extend credit and imposes charges periodically for delaying pay- 
ment of such accounts from time to time until paid, the charge 
so imposed comes within the definitions of a "finance charge" 
. . . applicable in each case to the amount of the unpaid bal- 
ance of the account. Under such circumstances . . . the disclo- 
sures required for open end credit accounts under 9 226.7 shall 
be made.64 
The Board Interpretation sets forth a simple formula for distin- 
guishing between bona fide "unanticipated late payment" 
charges and finance charges which need to be disclosed as part 
of the cost for extending credit. 
Several situations in which this Interpretation has been ap- 
plied illustrate the effect of this rule. If a hospital, for instance, 
continues to provide nonemergency services to patients with over- 
due accounts and routinely imposes periodic late payment 
charges, those charges may be considered a finance charge." On 
the other hand, if the hospital treats a delinquent account as in 
default, in that no further (nonemergency) services are provided 
until the delinquent account is paid, then the hospital can prop- 
erly impose a monthly charge of one percent on the outstanding 
balance of bills not paid within sixty days. In the latter situation, 
the monthly late payment charge would be a bona fide delin- 
quency charge under section 226.4(c). The Federal Reserve Board 
would not view such a charge as a disguised finance charge, since 
the bill is by its terms due in full within sixty days and the actions 
of the hospital after delinquency arises are consistent with normal 
collection  practice^.^^ 
One federal court has agreed with the Federal Reserve 
Board's interpretation by holding that monthly charges imposed 
64. Id. 
65. FRB Letter No. 909, Aug. 1, 1975, 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) fl 31,243. 
66. FFU3 Letter No. 912, Aug. 13, 1975, id. TI 31,246. 
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on credit card accounts not paid within sixty days were finance 
charges, not within the exclusion for "actual unanticipated late 
payment" charges, since they were imposed periodically while 
credit continued to be extended and payments were repeatedly 
late." The defendant oil company's argument that Interpretation 
226.401 was inconsistent with Regulation Z was rejected by the 
court 
A doctor or lawyer who assesses late payment charges on 
delinquent accounts for professional service fees may argue that 
Interpretation 226.401, applicable to open end credit plans, 
should not apply to his credit practices, since the account is for 
a single transaction and no further services are anticipated. The 
staff of the Federal Reserve Board, however, has expressed its 
opinion that such a characterization of the plan should make no 
difference? A similar rule applies to delinquency charges on a 
short term credit account: "[Qf a creditor continues to assess 
these charges without treating the account as delinquent or in 
default and without taking steps to collect the outstanding bal- 
ance, he is in fact imposing finance charges which should be 
disclosed as such."70 Thus, the crucial issue is the manner in 
which the doctor or lawyer acts in relation to the delinquent 
account.71 If he actively attempts to collect the account and gives 
every indication that he considers the account in default, then 
monthly late payment charges will be considered unanticipated 
and will not be viewed as a finance charge.72 If, however, the 
doctor or lawyer imposes late payment charges without taking 
steps to collect on the account, he must compute the finance 
charge and annual percentage rate and provide his patients or 
clients who do not make cash payments with these Truth in 
Lending disclosures during the office visit. A statement received 
- 
67. Kroll v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 352 F. Supp. 357 (N.D. Ill. 1973). 
68. Id. a t  362-63. 
69. FRB Letter No. 838, Sept. 4, 1974, 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 7 31,160. 
70. Id. 
71. See FRB Letter No. 797, May 16, 1974, id. fl 31,119; Unnumbered FRB Letter, 
July 9, 1969, [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 7 30,088. 
72. A number of doctors, dentists, and lawyers responded to the Billing Practice 
Survey, supra note 6, indicating their late payment charges would be bona fide: 
"[Late payment charges are assessed] only when no payments are made 
and then [as] collection charges." 
"[Late payment charges are assessed] only when we turn [accounts] over 
to our collector." 
"Sometimes, if account is bad, we assign it  to a corporation that collects 
it, charging regular interest." 
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by the client one week later is not timely for purposes of giving 
the required Truth in Lending disclosures for consumer credit 
involving finance charges. 73 
It may be helpful to demonstrate the effect of treating an 
attorney's late payment charges as a finance charge. Assume an 
attorney bills his client for legal services amounting to $500.00. 
The client receives a statement with a rubber stamp notice that 
all accounts not paid within sixty days will incur a late payment 
charge of 1-112 percent per month, but the attorney does nothing 
else with his delinquent accounts. Assuming that the attorney 
expects this fee to be paid in a single payment, as in a demand 
loan, he is then required by Regulation Z to figure the amount of 
the finance charge and the annual percentage rate as if the ac- 
count had a maturity of one-half year.'* Thus, the finance charge 
may include a late payment charge after 60,90,120,150, and 180 
days. At a rate of 1-112 percent per month on a principal balance 
due of $500.00, without compounding the interest charges, the 
finance charge would be five times $7.50, or $37.50, which on a 
charge of $500.00 for six months works out to be an annual per- 
centage rate of 15 percent. These disclosures must be made a t  
the time the fee arrangement for legal services is consummated, 
that is, before the credit is e~tended. '~ 
C.  Discounts for Prompt Payment 
Another tool for inducing timely payment by patients and 
clients, the prompt payment discount, is becoming increasingly 
common among professionals."This inducement is attractive to 
patients, but the effect of this practice is harsh on those who do 
not take advantage of the discount. Patients who wait to make 
payment until they have received their bill have been charged a 
rather hefty finance charge for the privilege of paying on credit. 
Assume, for example, that a pafient owes a doctor $100, but the 
- 
73.8Truth in Lending Act 4 128(b), 15 U.S.C. 4 1638(b) (1970) ("disclosures . . . shall 
be made before the credit is extended"). 
74. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. 4 226.4(g) (1976) ("[o]bligations . . . which are payable on 
demand shall be considered to have a maturity of one-half year for the purpose of comput- 
ing the amount of the finance charge and the annual percentage rate"). 
75. Note 73 supra. 
76. The prompt payment discount is borrowed from commercial transactions where 
payment terms are often stated as "2%-10 days, net 30," which, interpreted, means that 
customers paying within 10 days of receipt of the statement can deduct 2% from the net 
amount due, otherwise the full price is due within 30 days. 
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doctor offers a ten percent discount for prompt cash payments. 
If the patient is able to pay cash before leaving the doctor's office, 
he pays only $90. If he waits for the statement and pays the bill 
for $100 within thirty days, he has paid a finance charge of $10 
for an extension of credit of one month. This amounts to a finance 
charge a t  an annual rate of 133 percent.77 
It is not surprising, therefore, that Regulation Z requires spe- 
cific disclosures for prompt payment discounts.78 The required 
disclosures include: 
(1) the date of the sale or invoice, 
(2) the rate of discount, 
(3) the date by which the discount may be taken, 
(4) the date by which the full amount of the obligation is 
due and payable, 
(5) the amount of the discount, designated as a "finance 
charge,"7g and 
- -- 
77. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(0)(2) (1976), sets forth a special formula for 
determining the annual percentage rate for cash discount transactions. 
This formula can be demonstrated by using the above example of 10% cash, net 30 
day payment arrangement. The amount of the finance charge ($10) is divided by the least 
amount payable to satisfy the obligation ($90). This quotient is multiplied "by a fraction 
in which the numerator is 12 and the denominator is the number of whole months (but 
not less than 1) between the first day of the monthly billing cycle in which the transaction 
is consummated and the first day of the monthly billing cycle in which the obligation 
becomes due." Id. Here the formula would be (10/90) x (12/1), which amounts to an annual 
percentage rate of 133%. The fact that the nondiscount payment could have been made 
within the first few days of the month is ignored, and the creditor is given the benefit of 
assuming that the payment will be made a t  the end of one month. 
78. Utility companies are generally exempt from the disclosure requirements of the 
Truth in Lending Act. They are thus able to offer prompt payment discounts without 
complying with the enumerated disclosure requirements that would be triggered if the 
public utility exemption were not part of the Act. Truth in Lending Act 4 104(4), 15 U.S.C. 
0 1603(4) (1970). 
Although RRgulation Z does not directly discuss them, other types of discounts may 
be permissible-e.g., allowances for relatives, settlements of long delinquent accounts, 
and bill adjustments in harsh circumstances-without necessitating Truth in Lending 
disclosures. Several professionals responding to the Billing Practice Survey, supra note 6, 
indicated that they allowed discounts in such limited circumstances: 
"When a client is hard pressed, we will offer to settle for less for a cash 
payment to avoid extensive billing." 
"If we are aware of unusual hardships or if the patient asks we often adjust 
the bill." 
79. Obviously, cash discount arrangements may well be discouraged when disclosures 
of the finance charge and annual percentage rate are required. In an effort to ease the 
impact on discount incentives, the newest amendments to the Truth in Lending Act 
provide that certain cash payment discounts as high as 5% will not be subject to disclosure 
as a finance charge. This special exemption regarding disclosure of the finance charge 
arises where the discount is made "available for the purpose of inducing payment for a 
purchase by cash . . . rather than by use of an open end credit card account." Truth in 
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(6) the "annual percentage rate,"" for discounts exceeding 
five percent of the obligation, unless the finance charge does not 
exceed $5 and is applicable to an amount financed not exceeding 
$75 or does not exceed $7.50 and is applicable to an amount 
financed exceeding $75Y These disclosures may be made on the 
invoice, which, contrary to the usual disclosure requirements, 
may be delivered after the transaction has taken place.82 
State consumer laws pose another hurdle for professionals 
who offer cash payment discounts to clients and patients. Many 
of these laws set limitations on the rates of interest that may be 
charged." For example, in states that have adopted the Uniform 
Consumer Credit Code (UCCC),84 the maximum rates allowed for 
consumer credit sales are generally between fifteen and thirty-six 
percent per annum, depending on the type and amount of credit 
extended? As noted above, the annual percentage rate for a ten 
Lending Act 8 167, 15 U.S.C. $ 1666(f) (Supp. V 1975); Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. EJ 226.4(i)(l! 
(1976). The following stringent conditions must be met: (1) the discount cannot exceed 
5% of the price of the goods or services;and (2) the discount must be "available to all 
prospective buyers, whether or not they are [credit] cardholders." This availability must 
be "clearly and conspicuously disclosed by a sign or display posted a t  or near each public 
entrance to the seller's place of business wherein such discount is offered." It must also 
be displayed "at all locations within the place of business where a purchase may be paid 
for." Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. $ 226.4(i)(l) (1976). If the discount is greater than 596, however, 
the entire amount of the discount must be disclosed as a finance charge to all consumer 
customers who do not take advantage of the cash discount. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. $ 226.4(i)(2) 
(1976); FRB Letter No. 985, Dec. 31, 1975, 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) l'l 31,325. 
80. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. $ 226.8(0) (1976). FTC Informal Staff Opinion, Apr. 2, 1970, 
[1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 30,361. 
81. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. $0  116.8(b)(2), 226.8(o)(l)(v) (1976). 
82. Id. 8 226.8(0)(8). 
83. For a helpful summary of state usury and rate limitation laws, see 1 CONS. CRED. 
GUIDE (CCH) fi 510 (1976). 
84. The states that have adopted the UCCC are Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Maine, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. The UCCC 
is a comprehensive consumer credit protection law. I t  regulates maximum charges, rate 
ceilings, disclosure requirements, enforcement rights, contract terms, and advertising. 
The UCCC was created to eliminate conflicts and inconsistency in the consumer credit 
area among the various states. Its purpose was to make competition the major factor in 
the establishment of credit prices. The original text was drafted in 1968 and amended in 
1974. 
85. UCCC 8 2.201(2). 
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percent discount on a $100 charge will amount to 133 percent, 
which violates the rate ceiling of the UCCC. Thus, even though 
the rate need not be disclosed under the Truth in Lending Act (if 
the discount does not amount to more than five percent), the 
discount arrangement may nonetheless be illegal if it exceeds the 
rate limitation of the state law? 
There is a major exemption, however, that will immunize 
many credit transactions against the UCCC's maximum rate lim- 
itations. For credit sales other than revolving charge accounts, 
the UCCC permits a minimum service charge of not more than 
$5 for transactions where the credit extended does not exceed $75, 
and a service charge of not more than $7.50 for transactions where 
credit of over $75 is extended." For instance, a lawyer or doctor 
could not legally offer a standard discount of five percent in states 
that have UCCC rate limitation laws in any credit arrangement 
for fees amounting to more than $150, since five percent of $150 
is $7.50, which is the maximum service charge allowable in order 
to qualify for exemption from the state's rate limitation. Without 
the exemption, higher discounts would represent finance charges 
at  a prohibited, high rate of interest. If the discount were more 
substantial, for instance ten percent, then the professional would 
need to be even more careful. A ten percent discount would be 
exempt from the rate ceiling law only if the amount financed were 
not more than $50. Any greater amount would result in a discount 
in excess of the minimum service charge. Stripped of that exemp- 
tion from the maximum rate laws, the discount arrangement 
would be outlawed. 
In sum, the doctor or lawyer who offers prompt payment 
discounts may safely avoid Truth in Lending violations by ob- 
serving the following practices: 
(1) If the prompt payment discount is the only credit ar- 
rangement offered, the professional may comply with the Truth 
in Lending requirements by using a rubber stamp on his billing 
statement that reads? 
86. For example, in a 5 percent discount arrangement, the credit client who pays 
within one month is being charged an annual percentage rate of more than 63 percent (5/95 
x 1211 = 60195 = 63.2% APR). 
87. UCCC § 2.201(6). 
88. Adapted from J. FONSECA, CONSUMER CREDIT COMPLIANCE MANUAL 57 (1975). 
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The following information is supplied pursuant to the Fed- 
eral Truth in Lending Act: 
Date 
2. Amount necessary to pay in full 
if payment is made by (date) 
3. FINANCE CHARGE ( %  discount) (1-2) 
This amount expressed as an ANNUAL PERCEN- 
TAGE 
RATE is % 
In using this disclosure form, the doctor or lawyer should remem- 
ber that the annual percentage rate disclosure does not have to 
be made if (a) the finance charge does not exceed $5 and the 
amount financed does not exceed $75, or (b) the finance charge 
does not exceed $7.50 and the amount financed exceeds $75,@ or 
(c) if the discount for prompt payment does not exceed five 
percent 
(2) If patients or clients who forego the prompt payment 
discount are subject to additional finance charges or payments in 
more than four installments, then the doctor or lawyer must com- 
ply with the full panoply of Truth in Lending disclosure require- 
ments in addition to the special disclosures required because of 
the prompt payment disco~nt.~' 
The criminalg2 and civile3 penalties imposed on creditors who 
89. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. Q 226.8(b)(2) (1976). 
90. Id. Q 226.8(o)(l)(v); FRB Letter No. 138, Oct. 10, 1969, [1969-1974 Transfer 
Binder] CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) fi 30,483. 
91. Id. Q 226.8(0)(7); FRB Letter No. 201, Dec. 5, 1969, [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] 
CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) fi 30,507; FTC Informal Staff Opinion, Apr. 23, 1970, id. fi 
30,376. 
92. Truth in Lending Act Q 112, 15 U.S.C. Q 1611 (1970). 
93. Id. Q 130, 15 U.S.C. Q 1640. The civil penalty provisions of Truth in Lending have 
been subject to recent criticism: 
In a recent statement before the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Con- 
sumer, and Monetary Affairs, Philip C. Jackson, Jr., a member of the Federal 
Reserve Board, asked that Congress study the possibility of limiting the penalty 
provisions of the Truth-in-Lending Act to violations that actually interfere with 
the consumer's ability to make meaningful comparisons of credit terms. 
He said the Fed has repeatedly testified before Congress that the majority 
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violate the Truth in Lending disclosure requirements are severe 
enough to make careful compliance with the Act's requirements 
important to the professions. The most effective penalty provi- 
sion permits consumer victims to bring civil actions to recover 
specified statutory damages. The injured consumer is entitled to 
a statutory penalty amounting to a minimum recovery of $100 for 
each violation and a maximum of $1,000." In addition, the suc- 
cessful consumer litigant is entitled to recover attorneys' fees and 
costs from the violating ~reditor.'~ 
D. Application of Other Consumer Credit Laws to the 
Professions 
Other federal credit laws affecting professionals include the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act,M the Fair Credit Billing Act," and the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act,'% all of which are part of the Fed- 
eral Consumer Credit Protection Act. Also, specific restrictions in 
the Uniform Consumer Credit Coden govern consumer credit 
transactions in several states.loO 
Lawyers occasionally seek to obtain reports on clients, par- 
- 
of violations are purely technical in nature and are due to unintentional and 
inevitable human error. In most violations the consumer is neither overcharged 
nor misled. Under present law, a creditor may be penalized for purely technical 
violations in which the consumer may have been unaware a t  the time and which 
in no way entered into the decision to accept or reject the credit terms offered. 
Technical violations could be dealt with by administrative remedies. 
Jackson pointed out that only a limited number of terms seem to be genu- 
inely helpful to a consumer in making a meaningful comparison of credit terms. 
These probably include the annual percentage rate, the finance charge, the 
amount financed and the repayment schedule. Perhaps only material misstate- 
ments of these terms should be brought to the attention of consumers and civil 
liability should only attach where such misstatements have occurred. While 
individual suits provide an important enforcement tool, the Fed believes that 
Congress should carefully review the present civil liability provisions to deter- 
mine whether modification of them might reduce needless litigation and the 
resulting regulatory complications. 
1 CONS. & COMM. CRED. (P-H) 7 6.4 (1976). 
94. Truth in Lending Act 4 130(a)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(l) (1970). 
95. Id. 8 13O(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. 8 1640(a)(2). 
96. The Fair Credit Reporting Act is Title VI of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 
15 U.S.C. 98 1681, 1681a-t (1970). 
97. The Fair Credit Billing Act is integrated into existing law by appropriate amend- 
ments to Title I (Truth in Lending) of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§  
1666, 1666a-j (Supp. V 1975). 
98. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act is Title V of the Consumer Credit Protection 
Act, 15 U.S.C. $8 1691, 1691a-e (Supp. V 1975). 
99. UCCC § 3.301-.309 (1974 version). 
100. See note 84 supra. 
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ties to a lawsuit, witnesses, and jurors from credit bureaus, which 
are subject to the provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.lol 
Under that  Act, credit reporting agencies cannot release con- 
sumer reportslo2 unless the use of the report is specifically sanc- 
tioned by the Act.lo3 Lawyers can lawfully receive consumer re- 
ports under the Act if the reports are to be used in connection 
"with a credit transaction involving the consumer . . . and in- 
volving the extension of credit to, or review or collection of an 
account of, the consumer."104 Thus, attorneys attempting to dis- 
cover information regarding a client's delinquent customer can 
obtain consumer reports. Similarly, doctors and lawyers obtain- 
ing information in advance of extending credit to a patient or 
client are entitled to receive consumer reports. It is no longer 
proper, however, for credit bureaus to give attorneys reports from 
their consumer credit files if the attorney will use the information 
for noncredit purposes such as sizing up prospective jurors. To 
gain information from a credit bureau for that purpose, the attor- 
ney must request a special investigation, in which the consumer 
reporting agency must avoid using information originally col- 
lected, used, or intended for use in consumer reports. The agency 
must keep the information obtained in such a special investiga- 
tion separate from the information held for use in future con- 
sumer reports.lo5 If a doctor or lawyer declines to extend credit to 
patients or consumer clients because of information contained in 
a consumer report, he is required to inform the consumer of this 
fact and must give the consumer the name and address of the 
reporting agency. lo6 
The Fair Credit Billing Act requires all creditors who extend 
open end credit to provide periodic information to consumer- 
debtors detailing the procedures available to the debtor for dis- 
puting alleged billing errors.lo7 For the most part, doctors and 
lawyers are not subject to these special requirements, since the 
credit they extend is not like the revolving charge account sys- 
tems that are within the definition of open end credit.I0Wonethe- 
101. Foer, What Every Lawyer Should Know About Consumer Reports, 61 A.B.A.J. 
857 (1975). 
102. Fair Credit Reporting Act $ 603(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (1970). 
103. Id. § 604, 15 U.S.C. 4 1681. 
104. Id. 604(3)(A), 15 U.S.C. $ 1681b(3)(A). 
105. Foer, supra note 102, at 858. 
106. Fair Credit Reporting Act 8 615, 15 U.S.C. § 1681m (1970). 
107. Truth in Lending Act § 127(a)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 1637(a)(8); § 127(c), 15 U.S.C. § 
1637(c) (Supp. V 1976); Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.7(a)(9) (1976). 
108. Truth in Lending Act § 103(i), 15 U.S.C. $ 1602(i) (1970); Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 
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less, procedures for resolving and answering consumer credit com- 
plaints should be adopted as far as possible by doctors and law- 
yers who extend credit, if for no other reason than to deal effi- 
ciently with such problems and to avoid alienating patients and 
clients because of billing disputes.Iog 
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, as originally adopted,"" 
is aimed a t  eliminating discrimination in the consumer credit 
market on the basis of sex. Amendments to the Act now prohibit 
discrimination based on race, color, religion, national origin, or 
age."' Doctors and lawyers should be familiar with the require- 
ments of this Act to avoid unlawful discrimination in whatever 
credit arrangements they make with patients and clients. Among 
other general requirements,"* a creditor may ask only limited 
questions about an applicant's marital status.Il3 In addition, each 
applicant for credit must be given a written notice stating: "The 
Federal Equal Credit Opportunity Act prohibits creditors from 
discriminating against credit applicants on the basis of sex or 
marital status. The Federal agency which administers compli- 
ance with this law concerning this [office] is (name and address 
of the appropriate agency). "I l4  Consumers whose credit accounts 
were established prior to and remained in existence on November 
1, 1976, are entitled to receive a special statutory notice by Febru- 
ary 1, 1977.Il5 This notice is designed to acquaint married women 
226.2(x) (1976); FRB Letter No. 960, Nov. 28,1975,5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) fi 31,299. 
See notes 26-37 supra for discussion of characterization of open end versus closed end 
credit arrangements. 
109. See generally Littlefield, Federal Consumer Credit Legislation-Some New 
Developments (pts. 1-2), 80 COM. L.J. 312, 349 (1975). 
At least one attorney who responded to the Billing Practice Survey, supra note 6, 
includes the Fair Credit Billing Act's prescribed disclosure entitled "In Case of Errors or 
Inquiries About Your Bill" on the back of the firm's monthly statement form. 
110. Equal Credit Opportunity Act 4  503,15 U.S.C. 4 4  1691, 1691a-e (Supp. V 1975). 
111. Act of Mar. 23,1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239,90 Stat. 251 (effective Mar. 23, 1977). 
112. Pursuant to the authority of § 503 of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 
U.S.C. 6 0  1691, 1691a-3 (Supp. V 1975), 12 C.F.R. 4  202 [hereinafter referred to as Reg. 
B] was adopted on October 22, 1975. 
113. Reg. B., 12 C.F.R. 4  202.4(c) (1976). 
114. Id. 4  202.4(d). 
115. The notice requirement for previously established accounts is satisfied by the 
following form: 
NOTICE 
CREDIT HISTORY FOR 
MARRIED PERSONS 
The Federal Equal Credit Opportunity Act forbids all creditors from dis- 
criminating against any applicant on the basis of sex or marital status in any 
aspect of a credit transaction. Regulations adopted under the Act give married 
persons the right to have credit information concerning those credit accounts 
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with their right to have credit information reported in their own 
names as well as their spouses' names with respect to the history 
of a credit account that a married woman shares with her hus- 
band or is authorized to use. Except as expressly permitted under 
the Act, the creditor may not inquire concerning the spouse of an 
applicant unless the spouse will be permitted to use the account 
or the spouse will be contractually liable upon the account.I1"f 
credit is denied, the applicant must receive a notice of the denial, 
and has a right to receive reasons for such action upon request.It7 
These restrictions apply if the applicant for credit will use the 
service primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.11R 
Generally, doctors and lawyers will escape the more onerous 
requirements of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, such as pro- 
viding written notice and refraining from inquiries about marital 
status or concerning the spouse, since they will usually fit within 
that they hold or use jointly with a spouse reported to consumer reporting 
agencies and creditors in the names of both the wife and husband. Accounts of 
married persons opened before November 1976-even those opened in the names 
of both spouses-are often reported in only the husband's name. This is gener- 
ally true regardless of who has been paying the bills or whose income was used 
to obtain the account. As a result, many married women do not have a credit 
history in their own names, although their husbands do. If a woman ever needs 
to obtain credit on her own, for example, when divorced or widowed, a credit 
history is usually necessary. 
If your account(s) with us is a joint account which you share with your 
spouse or an account(s) in the name of one spouse which the other spouse is 
authorized to use, you have the right to have credit information concerning it 
reported in both your name and your spouse's name. If you choose to have credit 
information concerning your account(s) with us reported in both your name and 
the name of your spouse, please fill in the statement below and return it to us. 
Please note that the Federal regulation provides that your signature below 
will not make either you or your spouse legally liable for any different or greater 
debts. It will only request that credit information be reported in both your 
names. 
When you furnish credit information on this account, please report all 
information concerning it in both our names as follows: 
Account Number 
(if any) 
(print or type) 
(print or type) 
Signature of either 
spouse 
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an "incidental credit" exemption contained in the Act.llS To fit 
within this exemption, the credit extended by the doctor or law- 
yer must meet all of the following requirements: 
(1) the credit is not represented by and does not arise from 
the use of a credit card; [since the definition of creditor "does not 
include a person whose only participation in a credit transaction 
is to honor a credit card,"Iz0 most credit card transactions are 
exempt in any event] and 
(2) no finance charge . . . late payment or other fee is or 
may be imposed other than statutory interest or other costs re- 
coverable in legal proceedings for the collection of the credit; and 
(3) there is no agreement by which the credit may be pay- 
able in more than four  installment^.^^^ 
If a doctor or lawyer fits within the incidental credit exemp- 
tion of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, he is subject only to 
the general rule prohibiting di~cr i rn inat ion~~~ and to certain spe- 
cific restrictions such as those prohibiting inquiries about the 
childbearing intentions or capability of the applicant? Further- 
more, he must not refuse to set up a separate account for a credit- 
worthy applicant on the basis of sex or marital status,124 refuse to 
use the birth-given first name and surname of the applicant,lZ5 or 
engage in any other practices deemed to be particularly offensive 
under the Act as interpreted by the framers of Federal Reserve 
Board Regulation B.126 
Among the prohibitions of the Uniform Consumer Credit 
Code that may require doctors and lawyers to modify their proce- 
dures with clients and patients is the role against taking a nego- 
tiable promissory note in a consumer credit transaction.ln The 
119. Id. 202.10(b). 
120. Id. 8 202.3(j). 
121. Id. § 202.10(b). 
122. Id. 4 202.2. 
123. Id. § § 202.5(h), 202.10(b). 
124. Id. $ 202.4(b). 
125. Id. 5 202.4(e). 
126. Id. 4 202.10(a)-(b). 
127. UCCC 3.307 (1974 version) provides: "With respect to a consumer credit sale 
or consumer lease, . . . the creditor may not take a negotiable instrument other than a 
check dated not later than ten days after its issuance as evidence of the obligation of the 
consumer." 
One of the dentists responding to the Billing Practice Survey, supra note 6, offers a 
credit plan to patients that violates the cited provision. He explains on his statement that 
one alternative for payment is by means of "a series of post dated checks which we will 
hold and deposit on the date posted." The Utah law applicable to the dentist is not 
violated, however, because it is based on an earlier version of the UCCC which prohibits 
use of negotiable instruments "other than a check". No postdating provision exists.U~~Ii 
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garnishment limitation of the UCCC1" and of the Federal Con- 
sumer Credit Protection Act129 also affect the creditor's ability to 
reach the wages of a delinquent debtor. There is, for example, no 
longer any garnishment permitted before judgment against a con- 
sumer debtor has been obtained,130 and the amount of a con- 
sumer's wages that may be garnished is usually limited to no 
more than twenty-five percent of the wage earner's take-home 
pay. 131 For the most part, these restrictions are easily observed. 
This summary of consumer credit laws affecting the profes- 
sions reveals that unless the attorney or doctor obtains informed 
advice regarding his credit practices, with special attention to the 
Truth in Lending disclosure requirements, he is taking considera- 
ble risk if he engages in any one of the following credit practices: 
(1) Agreements with his clients permitting payments for 
professional services in more than four installments. (Even if he 
does not expressly agree to be paid in more than four install- 
ments, if a majority of his patients or clients pay in that manner, 
there is a possibility that his transactions may be subject to the 
Act's disclosure requirements.) 
(2) The imposition of late charges on delinquent accounts 
when the professional fails to institute collection or continues to 
provide services to the delinquent account debtor. (It should also 
be noted that the mere imposition of late payment charges on 
accounts subjects an attorney or doctor to the full requirements 
of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.) 
(3) Offers of prompt payment discounts to clients or pa- 
tients. (The requirements for complying with the Truth in Lend- 
ing Act are more difficult if the discount exceeds five percent.)132 
If the doctor or attorney is unwilling or unable to seek in- 
formed counsel on these credit matters, he is best advised to 
avoid new techniques designed to induce efficient and prompt 
payment of his outstanding accounts.133 He should, instead, care- 
CODE ANN. § 70B-2-403 (1954). Another respondent is also in violation of either the 
amended or the previous version of the UCCC in that "long outstanding debts are some- 
times transferred to a promissory note with 10% interest," unless the debtor is not a 
consumer. 
128. UCCC $ 0  5.104-.I05 (1974 version). 
129. Consumer Credit Protection Act § 301-07, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-77 (1970). 
130. UCCC 8 5.104. See also Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1933). 
131. UCCC § 5.105(2); Consumer Credit Protection Act 4 303, 15 U.S.C. § 1673 
(1970). 
132. See text accompanying note 90 supra. 
133. One response to the Billing Practice Survey, supra note 6, is illustrative: "Our 
firm has used several methods of billing for consumer credit in the past, but we found 
them all to be more trouble than they were worth in light of the Federal and State 
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fully qualify for the consumer credit laws built-in exemptions for 
the traditional credit practices employed by the professions. If 
the doctor or lawyer is content with the old "professional" 
method of permitting clients to pay as they can, without any 
finance charge or late payment charge being imposed, without 
expressly agreeing to a specified installment payment arrange- 
ment, and without giving prompt payment discounts, then he 
need not worry about complying with consumer credit disclosure 
requirements. As will be suggested below, however, the public 
may not be served optimally by this traditional professional ap- 
proach. Doctors and lawyers adopting modern credit practices in 
order to more efficiently deliver professional services to patients 
and clients of moderate means must be willing to pay the in- 
creased costs of assuring themselves that their credit practices are 
in line with federal and state consumer credit laws. The laws, 
regulations, and interpretations are complex and difficult enough 
that professionals should be willing to employ specialists to set 
up proper forms, systems, and practices. 
The regulatory apparatus for the growing consumer credit 
market has expanded as rapidly as the Credit practices them- 
selves. Lawyers, doctors, and their professional associations 
should become acquainted with the present situation without 
delay. Otherwise, the consuming public will eventually force 
them to comply with consumer credit laws through the private 
attorney general remedies available in the statutes. Indeed, i t  has 
been suggested that "Truth in Lending has become a trap for the 
unwary." Doctors and lawyers may be among those who "will 
probably not come into compliance until they have been caught 
a couple of times."134 
Regulations governing the extension on consumer credit." This same firm has advised its 
professional clients (doctors and dentists) as-follows: 
In recommending to you your future course of action with respect to credit 
transactions, I feel no other alternative but to recommend that you avoid in- 
volvement in credit transactions wherever possible. This is not only because of 
the complexity of the regulations but also because such regulations are often 
amended and the forms that are shown . . . may become obsolete. One of the 
best alternatives for you, in my opinion, would be not to charge for small exten- 
sions of credit for routine treatments, and to use Bank Americard or Master- 
charge for larger bills. These two courses of action will eliminate computations 
for interest and compliance problems, and would leave collection responsibili- 
ties with the Bank Americard or Mastercharge people. 
134. B. CLARK & J. FONSECA, HANDLING CONSUMER CREDIT CASES 91 (Supp. 1976). 
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Although many professionals have not adopted credit prac- 
tices governed by Truth in Lending legislation, within the past 
decade the professional ethical standards relating to credit ar- 
rangements have been relaxed and in some cases reversed. Conse- 
quently, many traditional prohibitions against the use of credit 
plans and procedures have disappeared. This part of the article 
will describe various statements made by professional associa- 
tions regarding such consumer credit practices as the use of dis- 
counts, late payment charges, bank financing plans, and bank 
credit card systems. It will then evaluate recently adopted credit 
practice standards in the legal profession. 
A. Ethical Pronouncements by the Legal Profession 
Prior to the adoption of the American Bar Association's Code 
of Professional Responsibility, several opinions regarding the 
financial side of the attorney-client relationship referred to a 
maxim from Canon 12 of the Association's Canons of Professional 
Ethics: "In fixing fees it should never be forgotten that the pro- 
fession is a branch of the administration of justice and not a mere 
money -getting trade. "ls5 With emphasis on that principle, the 
Committee on Professional Ethics of the American Bar Associa- 
tion rejected several credit practices that were common business 
practices, including the use of discounts for prompt payment and 
late fees for delinquent accounts. As to discounts, the Committee 
stated in Formal Opinion 151 .that: 
Although the giving of discounts may be an entirely sound and 
proper practice in business, we do not think it is suited to the 
legal profession. Business transactions are frankly impersonal 
and commercial in character. On the other hand, the profes- 
sional relationship between an attorney and his client is highly 
personal, involving an intimate appreciation of each individual 
client's particular problem. Practices which overlook the per- 
sonal element in the attorney's relationship with his client and 
which tend toward an undue commercial emphasis are to be 
condemned. 136 
The Committee similarly proscribed the assessment of late fees 
135. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS NO. 12; ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL 
ETHICS, OPINIONS, NO. 151 (1936). 
136. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, NO. 151 (1936). 
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on delinquent accounts for the same basic reason-that the fixing 
of fees would be determined upon a basis other than fair and 
reasonable compensation for legal services performed, as man- 
dated by Canon 12. Thus the Committee ruled in Informal Deci- 
sion C-741 that it would be improper for a lawyer to indicate on 
his bill to clients that "[ilnterest at  the rate of 6% per annum 
will be charged on all accounts not paid within 30 days."'" 
In 1968, in the first pronouncement marking an apparent 
departure from the traditional approach to credit procedures, the 
American Bar Association's Committee on Professional Ethics 
sanctioned bank financing of legal fees, thereby approving plans 
adopted by several local bar a~soc ia t ions .~~~  In Formal Opinion 
320,13' the Committee made an exhaustive survey of the Canons 
affected by the approved financing plan and concluded that there 
were no valid objections to the plan and that there were adequate 
safeguards to meet all pertinent ethical standards. The chief ob- 
stacles to be cleared in approving the legal fee finance plans were 
grounded in the "commercialization" argument underlying for- 
mer opinions concerning late payment charges and discounts for 
prompt payments. A prior opinion by the Los Angeles County Bar 
Asso~iat ion, '~~ cited by the Committee in Opinion 320, represents 
the strong anticommercialization traditions and feelings shared 
by many lawyers: 
If the proposed financing plan were approved, and if such plan 
were to become common practice amongst attorneys, the  profes- 
sion unfortunately would be emulating the conduct of countless 
commercial establishments ranging from credit mercantile 
stores to such semiprofessional operations as advertising-credit- 
dentists. Such conduct would appear to be in direct violation of 
Canon 12 which admonishes lawyers never to forget that their 
profession is not a mere money-getting trade. Surely this admo- 
nition is applicable not only to the fixing of fees but also in the 
collection thereof .I4' 
Nonetheless, the Committee decided that the benefits to the pub- 
lic and to the profession outweighed the possibilities for abuse by 
137. ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, INFORMAL OPINIONS, 
NO. C-741 (1964). 
138. For an excellent article explaining the details of the Philadelphia Bar Associa- 
tion Plan, see Spiegel, Bank Financing of Legal Fees, 152 THE BANKERS MAGAZINE 20 
(1969). 
139. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, NO. 320 (1968), at 22. 
140. Id. at 23 (citing Opinion 228 of the Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n Comm. on 
Legal Ethics, Feb. 4, 1965). 
141. Id. at 24 (emphasis added). 
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indi~idua1s.l~~ The Committee also stated a guideline for evaluat- 
ing the propriety of new credit practices for the legal profession: 
"It is not only the right but the duty of the profession as a whole 
to utilize such methods as may be developed to bring the services 
of its members to those who need them, so long as this can be 
done ethically and with dignity."143 
Since the adoption of Formal Opinion 320, the American Bar 
Association has adopted the new Code of Professional Responsi- 
bility. Now, in place of the general canons, attorneys are guided 
by the ideals set forth in the Canons and Ethical Considerations 
of the Code and are limited by the proscriptions of the Discipli- 
nary Rules. The primary pronouncements regarding credit prac- 
tices by the legal profession are found under Canon 2 of the new 
Code-"A lawyer should assist the legal profession in fulfilling its 
duty to make legal counsel available." Ethical Consideration 2- 
16, for example, provides: 
The legal profession cannot remain a viable force in fulfilling its 
role in our society unless its members receive adequate compen- 
sation for services rendered, and reasonable fees should be 
charged in appropriate cases to clients able to pay them. Never- 
theless, persons unable to pay all or a portion of a reasonable 
fee should be able to obtain necessary legal services, and lawyers 
should support and participate in ethical activities designed to 
achieve that objective. 
One of the few opinions rendered by the Committee on Eth- 
ics and Professional Responsibility since adoption of the Code 
concerns the use of bank credit cards for the payment of legal 
services. In Formal Opinion 338,1d4 which is disappointingly brief, 
the Committee reversed its former position on the use of credit 
cards, stating its opinion "that the Code has overruled Informal 
Opinion 1176 and that the use of credit cards for the payment of 
legal expenses and services is permitted under the Code, provid- 
ing all of its provisions are fully and completely observed."145 This 
may be a correct application of the new Code of Professional 
Responsibility, but a closer analysis of the change and attention 
142. One commentary on the opinion emphasized the benefits to the " 'middle class' 
. . . who require the services of an attorney more often than they realize, but who are 
either financially unable to meet the expense in one payment or are reluctant to seek 
professional advice because of the fear of its high cost." Spiegel, supra note 139, at 21. 
143. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, NO. 320, at 29 (1968). 
144. ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL~, RECENT OPINIONS, NO. 
338 (197.4). 
145. Id. 
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to opposing viewpoints would have been helpful.'" The minimal 
restrictions established on the use of credit cards in Formal Opin- 
ion 338 include: 
(1) a requirement of prior approval of all publicity and ad- 
vertising relating to the credit card plan from the local bar asso- 
ciation; 
(2) a prohibition against a directory of the attorneys who 
subscribe to the credit card plan; 
(3) a strict limitation of promotional materials to a small 
sign in the attorney's office indicating availability of the credit 
card plan; 
(4) a requirement of neutrality by the attorney with respect 
to the use of the credit card plan in that he shall not encourage 
its use or charge clients who take advantage of the plan extra; 
(5) a restriction on the use of the credit card plan to pay- 
ment for legal services rendered and reimbursement for expenses 
actually paid by the attorney for the client; and 
(6) preservation of the confidential relationship between 
the attorney and his ~ 1 i e n t . l ~ ~  
It is one thing to permit banks or credit card companies to 
charge interest for financing legal services, since the attorney is 
not directly involved in charging or receiving the extra amounts 
paid for the privilege of obtaining credit. Other considerations 
might come into play, however, when the attorney receives fi- 
nance charges directly, not in payment for legal services ren- 
dered, but for the "banking" services of extending credit by per- 
mitting the client to pay for legal services over time. The state- 
ment in Formal Opinion 338 sanctioning bank credit card plans, 
however, ignores this distinction: 
A necessary corollary to the use of credit cards is the charg- 
ing of interest on delinquent accounts. I t  is the Committee's 
146. Significantly, Formal Opinion 320, which approved bank financing of legal fees, 
had already disposed of most of the arguments that could be raised against a bank credit 
card plan. See text accompanying notes 138-43 supra. 
147. ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, RECENT OPINIONS, NO. 
338 (1974). The results of the Billing Practice Survey, supra note 6, suggest that even when 
professionals permit payment by bank credit cards, few patients or client$ take advantage 
of this payment option. Typical remarks on this subject were: 
"Not very often used by patients but available in our office." 
"Only two patients in three years have chosen to use this type of payment." 
"Would be happy to use it, but no clients have done so." 
"We've never been asked to use cards, but would consider it favorably." 
"During five years of practice, only one client inquired regarding payment 
by bankcard." 
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opinion that it is proper to use a credit card system which in- 
volves the charging of interest on delinquent accounts. It is also 
the Committee's opinion that a lawyer can charge his client 
interest providing the client is advised that the lawyer intends 
to charge interest and agrees to the payment of interest on ac- 
counts that are delinquent for more than a stated period of 
time. 
In rendering this opinion, the Committee overruled Informal 
Decision C-741 
I t  appears, then, that attorneys are now allowed to provide 
bank credit card payment plans to their customers and that they 
may directly charge interest and impose finance charges on 
clients' delinquent accounts. There has been no recent opinion 
regarding discounts for prompt payment. Although this practice 
was formerly prohibited,150 it may be that under appropriate safe- 
guards it too could be done "ethically and with dignity."I5l 
B. The  Medical Profession's Ethical Standards 
The medical profession's ethical standards also have sanc- 
tioned new billing and credit devices. The Principles of Medical 
Ethics,152 like the legal profession's Code of Professional Responsi- 
bility, emphasize the service objectives of the profession? Both 
mention upholding the dignity and honor of the profession1" and 
prohibit solicitation of patients or c1ients.l" Medical opinions also 
-- 
148. Id. 
149. ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, INFORMAL OPINIONS, 
No. C-741 (1964). Although Formal Opinion 338 makes no explicit reference to Informal 
Opinion C-741, "[a] later formal opinion overrules earlier formal opinions or informal 
opinions with which it is necessarily in conflict . . . . This is true whether or not the 
earlier opinion is specifically mentioned in the later opinion." AE3A COMM. ON PROFES- 
SIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, NO. 317 (1967). 
150. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, NO. 151 (1936). 
151. Id. No. 320 (1968). 
152. The AMA's first code, adopted in 1847, has, in general, remained the same 
throughout the years. Major revisions did occur in 1903, 1912, and 1947. In 1955, an 
attempt was made to distinguish medical ethics from matters of etiquette. That proposed 
draft was not accepted, however. Subsequently, a proposal was made to change from the 
lengthy Code of Medical Ethics to the new Principles-10 short sections preceded by a 
preamble-which express the fundamental concepts that were embodied in the old Code. 
This proposal was adopted in June, 1957. AMA OPINIONS AND REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL 
COUNCIL, a t  IV-V. 
153. Id. 4 1, a t  VI; cf. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS NOS. 1 & 2. 
154. AMA OPINIONS AND REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL 4 4, at VI; ABA CODE OF 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Ethical Consideration 9-6. 
155. AMA OPINIONS AND REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL 4 5, a t  VI; m A  CODE OF 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rules 2-101 to -104. 
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frequently express the theme that  "the practice of medicine 
should not be commercialized nor [sic] treated as a commodity 
in trade."lJ6 The Principles of Medical Ethics also have specific 
provisions that apply to the financing aspect of the profe~sion. '~~ 
These include statements on fees, charges, collection practices, 
fee splitting, investments, and other related topics. Of special 
interest here are rules regarding assessment of delinquency 
charges on patients' accounts and use of bank credit cards, topics 
that are directly related to consumer credit. 
The medical profession has an express rule prohibiting delin- 
quency charges: "It is not in the best interest of the public or the 
profession to charge interest on an unpaid bill or note or to charge 
a penalty on fees for professional services not paid within a pre- 
scribed period of time . . . ."158 This medical profession rule is 
thus contrary to the most recent pronouncement by the legal 
profession on that topic. Bank credit card plans, however, have 
been approved by the medical profession in a manner similar to 
the American Bar Association's approval of such plans, with one 
additional caveat: 
the use of a bank card in connection with the payment of larger 
fees-which might normally be paid to the physician in install- 
ments-is not to be encouraged. All members of the Association 
are expected to continue the traditional practice of permitting 
patients of limited means to pay relatively large fees in install- 
ments without interest or carrying charges. Out of respect for 
the dignity and traditions of the medical profession, the physi- 
cian may not relieve himself of his obligations "to render service 
to humanity, reward or financial gain being a subordinate con- 
  id era ti on."'^^ 
156. AMA OPINIONS AND REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL § 5, NO. 20, a t  27 (1971). 
This pronouncement is reminiscent of the ABA's pronouncement about law as a profession 
rather than as a mere money-getting trade. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS NO. 12. 
157. Most statements regarding credit practices are connected with section 7 of the 
Principles: 
In the practice of medicine, a physician should limit the source of his profes- 
sional income to medical services actually rendered by him, or under his super- 
vision, to his patients. His fee should be commensurate with the services ren- 
dered and the patient's ability to pay. He should neither pay nor receive a 
commission for referral of patients. Drugs, remedies or appliances may be 
dispensed or supplied by the physician provided it is in the best interests of the 
patient. 
AMA OPINIONS AND REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL § 7, at VII. 
158. AMA OPINIONS AND REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL § 7, Opinion 12, a t  40 
(1971). 
159. Id., Opinion 14(3), a t  41 (1971). 
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Obviously the medical professional has not lost sight of the tradi- 
tional theme that underlies its ethical pronouncements on money 
matters: 
One of the strongest holds of the profession on public appro- 
bation and support has been the age-old professional ideal of 
medical service to all, whether able to pay or not. That ideal is 
basic in our ethics. The abandonment of that ideal and the 
adoption of a principle of service only when paid for would be 
the greatest step toward socialized medicine which the medical 
profession could take. lsO 
That same "age-old professional ideal" has also been a foun- 
dation of the legal profession. While the legal profession has re- 
cently adopted commercial credit practices, the context of these 
new developments suggests that the profession's attention to the 
worthy ideal of service to all has not been obscured or diminished. 
The remainder of this article evaluates the effect of modern credit 
practices on the legal profession, and argues that the adoption of 
such practices is ethically sound and does not threaten to reduce 
the profession to a mere "money-getting trade." 
C. Evaluating Credit Practice Standards of the Legal Profession 
The traditional model of providing legal services has required 
attorneys to assist "persons unable to pay all or a portion of a 
reasonable fee."lB1 Thus lawyers have historically provided free 
legal services to indigentslB2 and have permitted clients of limited 
means to pay relatively large fees in installments, without inter- 
est or carrying charges. 
Two significant developments in our society, which have 
been accelerating during the past decade, have an important 
bearing on this traditional modePs3 of extending professional ser- 
vices to indigents and people of moderate means.lB4 First, the de- 
velopment of federally financed legal service projects has resulted 
in an enormous increase in the amount of professional services 
160. Id. $ 1, Opinion 2, at 5 (1971). 
161. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Ethical Consideration 2-16. 
162. Id., Ethical Consideration 2-25. 
163. "The old ideal of the legal profession . . . that of the individual independent 
lawyer serving directly the individual independent client who chose his own lawyer and 
paid the fees out of his own funds" is changing. S. THURMAN, E. PHILLIPS, E. CHEATHAM, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION 55 (2d ed. 1970). 
164. The term "people of moderate means" is borrowed from B. CHRISTENSEN, BRING- 
ING LAWYERS AND CLIENTS TOGETHER (1968). He roughly characterizes this group in terms 
of income as those earning between $5,000 and $15,000 a year. Id. at 5 n.8. 
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provided to the poor.lE5 Because of the development of legal aid 
programs it is probable that lawyers in private practice will not 
be called on to provide legal services without compensation as 
frequently as they have in the past. Second, the increasing credit 
orientation of our economy166 has reached a high level of maturity 
and sophistication that is characterized by the adoption of the 
Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act and the corresponding 
extensive regulations. Businessmen have become more conscious 
of the costs of serving their customers as "bankers" whenever 
they allow payment on credit for goods and services. Likewise, the 
consumer has become more credit conscious because of the fre- 
quent reminders of the costs of credit provided by the myriad of 
monthly bills he receives containing Truth in Lending disclo- 
sures. Very few sales or services to be paid for over time are 
available without the familiar finance charge of 1 to 1-112 percent 
per month. The staggering growth of the consumer credit industry 
has contributed significantly to the increased ability of the Amer- 
ican consumer to purchase large cost items such as automobiles, 
furniture, appliances, and other durable goods. 
These significant societal changes threaten the traditional 
model for assiting clients of modest means in obtaining profes- 
sional services. For example, when a client is permitted to pay 
legal fees in installments without interest or carrying charges, the 
lawyer's bill will likely remain unpaid until all the bills imposing 
finance charges for delayed payment have been satisfiedP7 Con- 
165. Compared to where we were in 1964, one must conclude that the program 
has made a substantial dent in serving the poor. Expenditures are up sixteen- 
fold, the number of cases handled per thousand population has quadrupled, and 
the total number of cases handled annually has jumped from some 380,000 to 
over a million. 
H. STUMPF, COMMUNITY POLITICS AND LEGAL SERVICES-THE OTHER SIDE OF THE LAW 273 
(1975). Yet, "observers are in agreement that the legal services effort is but a drop in the 
bucket, the unmet need being immense." Id. 
166. "From the end of World War 11 through 1967, the amount of such credit out- 
standing had increased from $5.6 billion to $95.9 billion, a rate of growth more than 4 112 
times as great as that of the economy." Mourning v. Family Publications Servs., Inc., 411 
U.S. 356, 363 (1973). More recently the amount has doubled again to a high of $190.1 
billion in 1974. As of March 1975, the outstanding consumer credit amounted to $184.3 
billion. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 1975, at 475 (96th ed. 1975). 
167. An illustration of this problem in the context of the dental profession is seen 
in that profession's response to a recent advertisement for a credit car plan in a dental 
magazine: 
The most successful ad ever run by Master Charge-maybe the most successful 
magazine ad of 1973-was one in Dental Economics showing a handsome young man with 
a slightly crooked smile sitting in a wing chair with a small pile of envelopes in his lap, 
and holding up a piece of paper to be taken by his pretty wife, who leans affectionately 
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sequently, the "professional" aproach of the lawyer leads to a 
large backlog of delinquent accounts receivable that remain un- 
paid until the consumer sees his way clear to meet his other 
obligations, often incurred sub~equent1y.l~~ Since legal service 
costs are often extraordinary, unanticipated, and unbudgeted, 
the monthly paycheck is hard pressed to absorb the added burden 
of new installment payments related to professional services. Al- 
though the client may have every intention of paying the bill, he 
does not do so until he has extra cash on hand. "The inevitable 
result" of the traditional model "is that the attorney suffers eco- 
nomically by becoming a 'banker' for his client or, alternatively, 
being compensated a t  a rate not in keeping with the services 
performed."lM The real loser under this system, however, is the 
client, and ultimately the public, since it is perhaps inevitable 
that the attorney will give greater attention to the clients who do 
not need special accommodations regarding the payment of fees. 
In assessing the standards set by the legal profession for 
credit practices, it is essential to identify the public and profes- 
sional benefits supposedly flowing from the professional stan- 
dards and restrictions and to consider the conflicting values in- 
v01ved.l~~ The core problem involved is how people "who are ei- 
ther financially unable to meet the expense in one payment or are 
reluctant to seek legal advice because of the fear of its high 
over the back of the chair, her hair brushing his cheek. "It's only the dentist's bill," the 
young man is saying. "He can wait." The ad drew responses from more than 40 percent 
of the circulation of the magazine. 
M. MAYER, THE BANKERS 350 (1974). 
168. Several professionals indicated a concern regarding their billing practices (Bill- 
ing Practice Survey, supra note 6): 
"Billing and collecting has always been a problem in my office." 
"[Wle have recently become very concerned about unpaid accounts and 
whether or not we can help clear up the problem by employing the use of some 
kind of finance charge." 
"Billing clients is one part of private practice which I do not enjoy. I usu- 
ally end up requiring a substantial retainer in order to avoid the problem of 
delinquent accounts or extension of credit. 
169. Spiegel, supra note 138, at 21. The problem of unpaid accounts is illustrated by 
one lawyer's response to the Billing Practice Survey, supra note 6: 
"The head secretary now and then writes 'This account-is long overdue' in 
red ink on the statements or indicates that the firm will halt work in progress if 
not paid for past work. We bill monthly for about a year and if no payment is 
made, simply write the debt off. Nor do we ever sue for collection, a procedure 
which is viewed with some distaste in this area." 
170. The evaluative approach and analysis of this section was suggested by an Ameri- 
can Bar Foundation monograph dealing with the Bar Association's restrictions on adver- 
tising. B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 164. 
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cost"171 are affected when professional standards restrict full use 
of modern credit practices by attorneys. 
Before lawyers are freed from all credit practice restrictions, 
conflicting values must be considered. Permitting attorneys 
greater freedom in adopting credit practices from the business 
world may increase the availability of legal services to people of 
moderate means, induce more timely and regular payment of 
fees, allocate the cost of extending credit more directly to those 
who receive the credit, foster more clearly understood financial 
arrangements between the lawyer and client, and improve profes- 
sional relationships through reduced potential for personal feel- 
ings of guilt or conflict. These advantages must be weighed, how- 
ever, against the increased actual cost of legal services to individ- 
ual clients who pay in installments and the profession's concern 
with the   commercialization^' of the practice of law.lT2 
The ordering principle underlying these conflicting values is 
that the public interest should be served by the credit practices 
of the legal profession. Insofar as the public interest conflicts with 
the traditions of an honorable profession, the traditional profes- 
sional standards should be carefully scrutinized, since the justifi- 
cation for restrictions on the profession "should be in the extent 
to which they benefit the public as a whole and can thus be said 
to be in the public interest."173 
At first blush, it may seem paradoxical that the public inter- 
est is promoted by charging clients interest on delinquent ac- 
counts. For the individual client who must pay such interest, it 
is difficult to point to any benefits. Nonetheless, it can be argued 
that an attorney should permit clients to pay for legal services 
under a bank credit card plan, since there are in fact advantages 
to the client: 
(1) he can feel free to obtain legal services even though he 
cannot pay for them at once; 
(2) he has the convenience of paying for legal services in the 
same manner as he may elect to pay for other goods and services, 
including the postponement of the obligation to pay (without any 
finance charge) for as long as fifty-five days;lT4 and 
- 
171. Spiegel, supra note 138, at 21. 
172. The traditional concerns of professionals are illustrated by the comment of one 
attorney in the Billing Practice Survey, supra note 6: "I personally feel a Mastercharge 
or Bank Americard symbol on a secretary's desk in a law office portrays a poor professional 
image." 
173. B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 164, at 13 n.15. 
174. "[Tlhe 25-day 'grace period' authorized under typical bank credit card plans 
means that sharp consumers can do their shopping immediately after receipt of their 
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(3) he need not explain his present inability to make pay- 
ment, nor does he have to ask his attorney for special accommo- 
dations such as the privilege of paying a reduced fee or of paying 
the full fee in installments.Since it is the client himself who opts 
to  use the credit card plan, he makes the decision whether the 
opportunity of receiving credit is worth any finance charge he 
might incur. The availability of such credit would thus appear to 
serve the public interest without unduly offending the traditions 
of the legal profession.175 The profession has no concern with the 
manner chosen by the client of making a cash payment to the 
attorney for legal fees. The profession should not object to the use 
of a credit card plan any more than i t  would object to accepting 
money from a client who previously borrowed the payment from 
a bank, a friend, or a relative. 
Although bank credit card plans may help attorneys extend 
their services to a greater number of clients of moderate means, 
there must be other means available for clients who are not eligi- 
ble bank card holders. Furthermore, many fees will exceed the 
ceiling limits set by the bank for charges. Financing provided 
directly by the attorney himself becomes important a t  this point. 
It is more difficult to decide whether the public interest is 
better served by prohibiting than by permitting attorneys to 
charge clients interest directly for the privilege of paying legal 
fees over time. Such a practice is a clear departure from the 
traditional model. Yet, for the public as a whole, it may be advan- 
tageous. To fully evaluate the change, one must ask how existing 
billing patterns and attorney-client relationships might be af- 
fected by departures from prior restrictions. 
Is it fair to say that clients who pay their fees promptly under 
the traditional model subsidize those who pay on credit? If a 
retailing merchant engaged in a practice like the profession's tra- 
ditional model where no finance charges are assessed, the mer- 
monthly billing, thereby 'tacking' the 25-day 'grace period' to the time period before the 
next billing statement. Such machinations can result in 55 or 60 days of 'free credit.' " B. 
CLARK & J. FONSECA, HANDLING CONSUMER C EDIT CASES 171-72 (1972). A countemailing 
factor is that the client under the traditional model would have paid nothing for the 
privilege of paying in installments, whereas he will pay interest charges if he does not pay 
the credit card bill in full within the grace period. 
175. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Ethical Consideration 2-23 on 
limitations on suing a client for a fee. It appears that the attorney loses some control over 
his client's account. The client may, in fact, be sued by the credit card plan for failure 
to pay. The attorney's control over the decision whether or not to sue for his fees may have 
been delegated to the bank, although the attorney can at any time effectively repurchase 
the account by refunding his client's account through the credit card plan. 
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chant would be indirectly forcing cash customers to subsidize 
credit customers. The same analysis applies only roughly to the 
attorney -client relationship, since legal services are not always 
tied to standard fees. Unlike the costs of goods sold by a retailer, 
the cash price of legal services may vary considerably, depending 
on the circumstances of the individual matter and the client in- 
v01ved.l~~ Except to the extent these fees have been reduced for a 
client of moderate means, however, a reasonable fee should be the 
same for any one client whether he pays in cash or needs to make 
payments in installments over a period of time. In such a case, 
the attorney who assesses no finance charge is actually paid more 
by the cash-paying client than by the client who pays over time, 
since the attorney is deprived of the use of the installments until 
they have been paid. 
If the attorney is only occasionally involved in installment 
payment arrangements, the effect of granting credit without fi- 
nance charges is minimal and there is probably no effect on the 
fees paid by cash-paying clients. The attorney who serves primar- 
ily clients in business or clients with wealth can probably afford 
to provide his services on credit to an occasional client of moder- 
ate means. But what is the effect of the traditional model on 
attorneys who serve almost exclusively moderate income clients? 
Might he not be forced to raise his fees significantly if his clients 
took advantage of his willingness to accept payments in install- 
ments without the imposition of any interest charges? When the 
proportion of clients who pay in installments increases, the attor- 
ney or his cash-paying clients will have to absorb the costs of 
extending credit. As the attorney encounters a volume of delin- 
quent accounts, he will probably increase his fees or be more 
reluctant in extending credit in the future. If that is the case, 
cash-paying clients and future clients of moderate means who ask 
to pay in installments will be forced to subsidize the clients cur- 
rently paying on account. 
Why would an attorney want to impose interest charges on 
installment-paying clients? The attorney's primary interest is not 
in increasing his total earnings by assessing finance charges. He 
could do that by raising his charges for the legal services them- 
selves. Furthermore, most merchants who offer revolving charge 
176. The considerations to be weighed in setting reasonable legal fees are listed in 
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 2-106. The ability of the 
client to pay is not one of the factors listed, but the ethical considerations clearly state: 
"[P]ersons unable to pay all or a portion of a reasonable fee should be able to obtain 
necessary legal services." Id., Ethical Consideration 2-16. 
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accounts to their customers do not collect enough finance charges 
to meet their expenses.177 The real advantage to the attorney and 
the public interest involved in this departure from the traditional 
role is that it creates an incentive for prompt payment and is a 
method of increasing the availability of legal services to clients 
of moderate means.17R As soon as attorneys assess finance charges 
on delinquent accounts, their services will be treated by the bill- 
paying client in the same way that he handles payments for other 
goods and services purchased on credit; the disincentive that 
previously induced the client to postpone payment of the legal 
services bill until all others were paid will have been removed. 
Are there further ethical considerations to be raised in evalu- 
ating the prompt payment discount arrangement that have not 
been discussed in the context of credit cards and finance 
charges?17v As is reflected in the requirements of Truth in Lend- 
ing, customers who fail to take advantage of such discounts are 
in effect being assessed a finance charge.lm Thus, imposing in- 
terest charges and providing prompt payment discounts should 
be viewed as equivalents as far as ethical standards are con- 
cerned. They are both modern creditor devices that reward 
prompt payment and have the effect of charging consumers for 
the privilege of paying for goods or services on credit. 
177. NATIONAL RETAIL MERCHANTS A S'N, ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF DEPARTMENT 
STORE CREDIT 53 (1972). This study of 15 retail stores from various parts of the nation by 
Touche, Ross, Bailey & Smart showed that the total credit servicing costs exceeded the 
service charge revenue by 4.13%. These results are cited in 3 R. STUCKI, UTAH CONSUMER 
CREDIT REPORT 69, 73 (1974). 
178. In exploring the question "Why do retail merchants continue to extend credit 
to their customers if they incur losses in so doing?," one author explains: "The logical 
explanation seems to be that the merchant views credit as a selling device and a competi- 
tive necessity rather than a profitable endeavor in and of itself. Accordingly, anything that 
he can do to enhance total sales is of primary importance." R. STUCKI, supra note 177, a t  
74, 76. Retailers appear to accept the proposition that there is a direct relationship be- 
tween sales volume and the extent to which credit terms are offered to the buying public. 
The professions may also discover that increased use of modem credit practices will 
enhance their retailer's profit motive by making their legal counsel available to a larger 
portion of the public. 
179. Discount arrangements are more common among doctors and dentists than 
among lawyers, probably because of the differences in the kinds of services offered. The 
patient leaving the doctor's office generally knows what services have been performed and 
what standard costs will be assessed for those services. The doctor can, therefore, give the 
patient an option to be billed later or to pay the set fee immediately, in which case a 
discount is available. The lawyer is not often in the same position. After an initial visit, a 
client may know how much the lawyer's services will cost on an hourly basis, but the full 
fee cannot be ascertained until the services have been performed. There are major excep- 
tions to this situation, however, where discount arrangements could be used-in simple 
cases involving wills, default, divorce, or bankruptcy, for instance, where an attorney 
charges a set fee that he can explain to the client in advance. 
180. See text accompanying notes 76-78 supra. 
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Can it be claimed that abandonment of traditional financial 
arrangements will improve the quality and quantity of legal ser- 
vices being delivered to people of moderate means? Under the 
traditional model, the attorney may be inclined to pay less atten- 
tion to the affairs of the client who has not completed paying for 
previous services than to the affairs of the client who pays his fees 
on schedule. Likewise, the client who, under the traditional 
model, becomes delinquent in his payment of legal fees may be 
inhibited from bringing further matters to the attorney because 
of feelings of guilt or embarrassment. Under such circumstances, 
despite the highest ideals of morality and ethics, the professional 
relationship is likely to suffer. On the other hand, by handling 
such a relationship on a business-like, credit basis, the attorney 
and client know from the beginning that the privilege of delayed 
payment for legal services will be paid for by the client. 
The bar has traditionally expressed concern that the reputa- 
tion of the legal profession would be damaged if its image as a 
noncommercial enterprise ceased to exist. As one serious critic 
has pointed out, however, it is doubtful that many people would 
be shocked or alienated by expanded commercialization of the 
legal professi~n.~~'  The public simply does not connect an attor- 
ney's honor or honesty with his practice of charging clients a 
finance charge for delinquent accounts. Moreover, given the ac- 
cepted, widespread use of credit practices throughout our econ- 
omy, it seems unlikely that responsible participation by lawyers 
in such practices would give a pejorative, "commercial" taint to 
the profession. 
I t  can also be expected that the profession's serious concern 
with expanding the availability of legal services will be promoted 
by expanding the freedom of lawyers to use credit devices. There 
will always be bad credit risks, and some fees will never be paid 
whether or not interest charges are assessed. But the consumer 
credit market has evidenced that all but four or five percent of 
credit consumers do pay their bills.Ix2 By assessing finance 
charges, and thereby giving clients a greater incentive to pay their 
bills promptly, attorneys may be able to cut down on the backlog 
of overdue accounts receivable. Attorneys might then be more 
willing to serve clients of moderate incomes, and those same 
181. B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 164, at 32. 
182. "Consumer credit is an actuarial science. It is based on the fact that the large 
majority of citizens are honest and stable, that they keep their jobs, support their families, 
and pay their debts." J.  TURNER, THE BANKERS HANDBOOK 505 (1966), cited in M. MAYER, 
THE BANKERS 335 (1974). 
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clients would be more willing to seek legal services if they knew 
in advance that credit a t  reasonable rates was available to them. 
As bills are paid with greater promptness, attorneys may even be 
able to reduce the total fees they charge and still maintain the 
financial returns they require. 
I t  may be that the ABA's Professional Ethics Committee 
considered all of the factors presented here in reaching its deci- 
sion in Formal Opinion 338.1s3 If so, it is unfortunate that the 
Committee did not discuss them. In the absence of a more em- 
phatic and articulate approval, many attorneys may reject the 
new credit devices with the age-old cry that the law should avoid 
commercialization. This point of view overlooks the fact that 
modern credit practices that are carefully safeguarded by the 
various consumer protection laws may do much to make legal 
services more readily available to people of moderate incomes. 
The position of the American Bar Association appears to recog- 
nize this benefit to the public and the profession. In light of these 
considerations, members of the Bar should reassess their individ- 
ual financial practices. 
183. ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, RECENT OPINIONS, NO. 
338 (1974). 
